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The Consequences of Endogenous Timing for Diversification Strategies of Multimarket
Firms
by Silke Neubauer
When firms diversify into new markets in spite of the existence of diseconomies of scope, not
only firms' profits are affected, but also potential welfare is reduced. Nevertheless, multimarket
competition is the outcome of a game when players move simultaneously. A Cournot model is
developped where players can choose the timing of their action before deciding over quantities.
This helps firms to avoid the inefficiencies that ocur with multimarket competition. Whenever
the timing game has an impact on the outcome of the basic game, the consequences for welfare
are positive.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Bedeutung sequentieller Angebotsentscheidungen für diversifizierte Unternehmen
Die Diversifikation von Unternehmen in neue Märkte führt zu Effizienzverlusten und
Gewinneinbußen, wenn dadurch Spezialisierungsvorteile nicht mehr genutzt werden können.
Dennoch ist Diversifikation das Ergebnis eines simultanen Cournotspiels, in welchem sich zwei
Unternehmen auf zwei Märkten als potentielle Wettbewerber gegenüberstehen. Die Einführung
einer Vorstufe zum Cournotspiel, in welcher Unternehmen den Zeitpunkt ihrer Angebotsent-
scheidung in beiden Märkten wählen können, kann einen Teil dieser Ineffizienzen beseitigen.
Unternehmen konzentrieren sich auf je einen Markt. Wegen der Existenz potentieller Konkur-
renz sind die Wohlfahrtswirkungen trotz der resultierenden monopolistischen Marktstruktur im
Vergleich zum Ausgangsspiel positiv.1. Introduction
The reason for conglomerate firms to be active in several markets can often be found in
the existence of economies of scope. Especially when firms diversify from a particular
technology base to produce a wider range of outputs, they might be able to take advantage
of cost complementaries and thus increase their cost-efficiency. But firms enter new markets
not only when there are synergies on the cost- or demand side. In fact, it may be rational
for firms to compete in several markets even when there are diseconomies of scope. In
oligopolistic markets, marginal gains arising from entering a second market may outweigh
the marginal negative impact on production costs caused by diseconomies of scope such that
the result is multimarket competition.
1 The total effect on profits might well be negative in
comparison to the situation, where each firm specializes in one market. Taking the latter
situation(specialization)asabenchmark, theeffectonwelfareistwofold: thereisacompetition
effect of diversification that might lead to higher total output in each of the markets, but there
is also a negative efficiency effect reducing potential welfare.
A crucial reason for multimarket competition in the presence of diseconomies of scope is
the lack of commitment power when firms choose their strategies simultaneously. If they were
able to commit to specialize in one market, each firm would be able to increase its profits.
One way of modeling commitment power is through introducing sequential play. In
Stackelberg- or Price-Leadership games, a leading firm has the opportunity to commit to an
action before the other firms move. Usually, one of the roles - the leader- or the follower-role -
is preferred to the other. Whenever there are no institutionalized reasons for one firm being the
leader or the follower, this raises the question, who determines the order of moves.
The theory on endogenous timing tries to solve this question by considering Stackelberg-
or Price-Leadership equilibria as the outcomes of an extended game, where firms first decide
over thetiming of their action and then play the basic game (Cournot- or Bertrand) according to
the chosen timing.
2 It turns out that the conditions for sequential play being the outcome of an
endogenous timing game are very restrictive. In standard Cournot models, simultaneous play
remains the result of the extended game.
Empirical evidence predicts, that multipoint competition may help firms to assume market
leadership in different products catered to different markets. For example, Proctor & Gamble
and Kimberley Clark divided up leadership in the markets for disposable diapers and feminine
napkins.
3 Brandenburger / Nalebuff (1996) describes the case of two railroads competing to
service public utilities that use the laying of tracks as a first stage move in dividing markets.
In this paper the possibility to endogenously time Cournot strategies is introduced in a
4 See Dixon (1992), but also Bulow/ Geneakoplos/ Klemperer (1985) who implicitly adress this topic.
5 Another way to decide about the order of moves is by applying an indirect evolutionary approach. See Güth
(1997) for an evolutionary analisis of bargaining rules.
6 See Hughes / Kao (1997) for this example.
1context, where two two-product firms facing negative cost-linkages across markets compete
against each other in each market. It thus combines two lines of research: The theory of
multiproduct firms and multimarket contact and the theory of the endogenous determination
of simultaneous or sequential play in a Cournot game.
The former line of research has concentrated so far on two aspects:
One is the potential interrelation of markets through cost-or demand-linkages. The concept
applied on the cost-side is that of (dis-)economies of scope.
4 It describes the situation, where
the scope of the firm determines the costs incurred in each product-line. On the demand-
side, there may be intermarket-linkages caused by products being complements or substitutes,
reputation- and bandwagon-effects etc. Because of intermarket-relations, firms cannot decide
independently in each market, but have to take into account the potential effects in the related
market(s).
5
The second aspect dealt with in the theory of multiproduct firms is the effect of multimarket
contact on collusion. When the same firms meet in several markets, they are able to retaliate
against aggressive strategies of the other firm in any of the markets, where they compete.
This might foster tacit collusion whenever there is ’’slack enforcement power’’ which can be
transferred from one market to another.
6
The theory of endogenous timing evolved only recently. Hamilton /Slutzky (1990) were
among the first who formally developed a duopoly-game in which players can choose to move
’’early’’ or ’’late’’ in a first stage and decide over their quantity after having observed the
other player’s timing in a second stage. Robson (1990) considered endogenous timing in a
price-setting game when there are time-dependent costs of precommitment in a second stage.
Other authors took up the idea of endogenous timing and introduced imperfect information
about costs (Albaeck (1990)) or demand (Mailath (1993)) or applied it to the field of Political
Economy (Leininger (1993)). Nevertheless, the implications of endogenous timing in a two-
market context have been neglected so far.
Building on these two research lines, this paper addresses the following questions:
* Does the possibility to endogenously time Cournot strategies affect the incentives to
diversify in other markets if diseconomies of scope are present?
* Does the multimarket context affect firms’ incentives to move sequentially instead of
simultaneously?
* What are the welfare effects of conglomerate diversification in this extended game with
respect to a) conglomerate diversification without timing possibility, and b) two separated
monopolies in each market?
The main results and the organization of this paper are as follows: In chapter 2 the original
game of Hamilton/ Slutzky and its results are presented. It turns out that the conditions for
sequential play being the outcome of an endogenous timing game are very restrictive. In
7 See Baumol/Panzar/ Willig (1982) for a detailed overview.
8 See Bulow/ Geneakoplos / Klemperer (1985).
9 See Bernheim/ Whinston (1990) for a formal and detailed discussion of this topic.
2standard Cournot models, simultaneous play remains the result of the extended game.
Theimplicationsofthetiming-gameinatwo-market-contextwithdiseconomiesofscopeare
consideredinchapter3. Afterhavingintroducedthebasicmodel,itisshown,that,dependingon
importance of the diseconomies, there are different equilibriaof thetiming game: as long asthe
negativecosteffect issmall, firmsstill choosetomovesimultaneouslyasintheone-stagegame.
Inamiddlerange, therearethreepotential equilibriaofthetiminggame: onewithfirmsplaying
simultaneously at the early timing, and two symmetric sequential play equilibria with each firm
choosing ’’early’’ in one (distinct) market and late in the other. Nevertheless, by allowing pre-
play communication, the simultaneous play equilibrium can be ruled out: both firms prefer the
sequential play equilibria. When the parameter expressing the level of diseconomies of scope
reaches a critical value, simultaneous play ceases to be an equilibrium. But in addition to the
sequential play equilibriawith each firm leading in onemarket, therearetwo other (symmetric)
equilibria, where one firm leads in both markets. In this range, firms cease to compete in both
markets: there is a mutual entry threat, but both firms actually concentrate each on one market.
Finally, when the diseconomies of scope are very high, the timing game ceases to have an
impact on the outcome of the basic game. Each firm acts as a monopolist in one of the markets
regardless of the timing strategies of the first stage.
In chapter 4, the effects of the extended game on welfare are analyzed. It can be shown that
whenever the timing-opportunity leads to outcomes different from a one-stage game without
timing possibility, firms’ profits as well as consumer surplus is increased. Social surplus is also
bigger than or equal to surplus generated by an institutionalized two-market-monopoly with
two firms. Consequently, the timing-game helps approaching the first-best-solution whenever
there are diseconomies of scope.
2. The Endogenous Timing Game of Hamilton/Slutzky
In the extended game with observable delay (Hamilton/ Slutzky (1990)) players choose the
timing of their action in a stage prior to the ’’basic’’ quantity- setting game. Strategies at the
first stage are either early (e) or late (l) move. This leads either to simultaneous play (￿e or
￿, provided that both players chose either e, or l) or to sequential play (7￿ (72) provided that
player 1 (2) played e whereas player 2 (1) other chose l). In accordance with the results of the
timing game, players set their profit-maximizing quantities at the second stage. Considering a
Cournot duopoly, this would lead to the known Cournot solution (with ￿￿ for both players) in
the first case and the Stackelberg solution (with ￿u for the leader and ￿8 for the follower) in
the second (see fig. 2.1).
Hamilton/ Slutzky use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium. They assume that the
three equilibria of the basic game (N for simultaneous play, 7￿ and 72 for sequential play
with player 1 or 2 being the leader) have a (unique)
7 equilibrium in pure strategies. When
the leader-position is preferred to simultaneous play (which is always the case in a Cournot
: Amir(1996)shows, thattheuniquenessoftheequilibriumisnotnecessarilyrequiredforobtainingtheirresults.
3Figure 2.1: Reduced Extensive Form
game with monotone best responses)
8, the resulting equilibria of the extended game depend on
the preferences regarding the follower position. The following conclusions are then drawn by
Hamilton/ Slutzky in their theorems I-IV:
9
(a)When both players prefer the simultaneous move outcome N to their payoff as a follower,
the equilibrium of the game is N with both firms moving at the first opportunity.
(b) When both players prefer their follower profit to that of the simultaneous game, then the
equilibria are 7￿ or 72.
(c) When there is one player preferring the follower position to simultaneous play while the
other one prefers the leader profit to the Nash profit to the follower-profit, there is a unique
equilibrium with the first player moving late, the other player moving early.
The conditions on cost- and demand functions that lead to the different outcomes in the
Cournot casewith homogeneous goods are formally set up by Amir (1996). They turn out to be
ratherrestrictive, such that onewould expect simultaneous play in most ofthestandard Cournot
models.
If firms competed in two markets, there would be the possibility of a division of the
leadership role, such that each would act like a leader in one market and the asymmetric results
concerning leader- and-follower-profits of the one-market game were avoided. But with firms
competing in several independent markets, the general results of Hamilton/ Slutzky do not
change. The incentives to deviate from a timing strategy that induces sequential play stay the
same irrespective of a second market. Thus, also the conditions on cost- and demand-functions
stay the same for each market.
Nevertheless, if markets were interrelated through a common cost- or demand-function the
conditions on cost- and demand-functions stated for one single market can not be applied any
more. When there are diseconomies of scope, the timing game may help firms to commit to
specialize and thus to avoid superfluous diversification costs.
; For a formal proof see Amir (1996), proof of Lemma 2.2.
< For proofs see Hamilton/ Slutzky (1990).
43. Endogenous Timing and Diseconomies of Scope
I consider two firms (￿ ’￿ c2) being active in two markets (& ’ ￿c￿) . Whereas demand is
independent, production costs are interrelated. The following cost-function is assumed:
￿￿E%￿c+ ￿￿’S%￿ n }%￿+￿ n S+￿ sJo ￿’￿ c2￿
where % is the quantity produced in market A, + the quantity produced in market B. I will
normalize c to zero to simplify the analysis.
10 The parameter g is restricted to be positive and
smaller than 2. In that case firms face diseconomies of scope by producing in two markets.
11
These can be due to switching costs when there are joint capacities or increased maintenance
costs of flexible techniques. Other examples are increasing marginal opportunity cost of
constrained capital or management skills or forgone learning-effects when producing smaller
quantities of each product.
Demand is linear and can be expressed by the inverse demand-function:
R
￿E%￿c% 2￿’@￿ %￿ ￿%2 E6@o&e| ￿￿
R
￿E+￿c+ 2￿’@￿ +￿ ￿+2 E6@o&e| ￿￿
When diseconomiesof scopearehigh (￿ ￿ }￿2), therearetwopotential equilibriaof the one-
stage Cournot game with simultaneous play. One is a boundary solution where firms choose to
leave one market and concentrate each on one market. It implies firms choosing their optimal
monopolistic output in one market and producing nothing in the other. Given this situation
(%￿ ’
@
2c+ ￿ ’f c% ￿ ’f c+ ￿ ’
@
2), it does not pay to invade the other market for neither firm:
The marginal gain from entering the second market would be the monopoly price of R6 ’ @
2,
whereas the marginal increase of production costs is }
@
2, which equals or is bigger than R6 if
} ￿ ￿.







therefore equals the profit resulting from a monopoly in both markets with each firm being
monopolist in one market.
But there is another potential equilibrium with both firms being active in both markets and
choosing




43 This does not alter the qualitative results obtained.
44 see Dixon (1992) for a similar approach. Bulow/Geanakoplos/Klemperer (1985) consider quadratic unit-costs
of each single product.
45 This can also be seen by checking the derivatives of the profit function at {l @ d
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5It is the interior solution of the two-market game and yields
￿￿E￿c￿￿’
@2E2 n }￿2
E￿ n }￿2 ￿
Nevertheless,fromtheplayers’viewpoint,theformer(monopolistic)equilibriumdominatesthe
equilibrium withtwo-market-competition. Ifplayerswereabletocoordinateonequilibria, they
wouldunanimously chooseto leaveeach onemarket. Inatwo-player-context, theability topre-
communicate is a realistic assumption.
13 I will therefore assume players’ ability to coordinate













%￿ ’ +￿ ’f c￿ 9’ ￿c
is the relevant result of the one-stage Cournot game for ￿ ￿ }￿2.
When firms move simultaneously and f ￿}￿ ￿ , the boundary solution stated above is not
an equilibrium. Firmshavean incentive to producein both markets in spiteofthediseconomies
of scope and the fact that they both would do better monopolizing one market each: departing
from the situation where each firm acts like a monopolist in one market, the marginal gain
from invading the other market (’ @*2) offsets the marginal negative impact on the production
costs (’ }
@
2). The equilibrium profit is thus ￿￿E￿c￿￿’
2@2E￿n}￿2




e . Firms thus face a prisoner’s dilemma when f ￿}￿ ￿.
Things might change if firms were given the possibility of commitment through deciding
over the timing of their action: This possibility could help firms to produce asymmetrically in
the two markets.
In accordance with the endogenous timing game of Hamilton/ Slutzky (1990) I introduce a
stage prior to the quantity setting stage, in which firms can choose to set their quantity either
early (e) or late (l) in each of the markets. If both firms choose the same timing in one market,
they have to set their quantities in the second stage simultaneously. Otherwise, the player who
has chosen ’’early’’ is acting as a leader, whereas the other player having chosen late acts like a
follower.
46 Obviously, increasing the number of the players involved, pre-pay communication will get more and more
difficult. For this argument, see Fudenberg/ Tirole (1995), p.21 - 22.
47 Aumann (1990) doubts, that pre-play communcation results in the elimination of pareto-dominated equilibria,
if the loss when the other player chooses the other equilibrium strategy is too high. He assumes a game,
where each player can be sure of a moderate payoff, when playing the strategy of the dominated equilibrium,
regardless of the strategy of the other player, whereas he incurs a loss playing the strategy of the dominant
equilibrium and the other plays the strategy of the dominated equilibrium. However in the games analized
here, there is no ’’safe’’ strategy. Regardless of the equilibrium strategy chosen, players incur a loss, if one
erroneously plays the other equilibrium strategy.
6The strategy-spaces and the resulting competitive situations are shown in fig. 3.1:
￿q2 ece ec, ,ce ,c,
ece ￿ec￿e ￿ec7￿ 7￿c￿e 7￿c7￿
ec, ￿ec72 ￿ec￿, 7￿c72 7￿c￿,
,ce 72c￿e 72c7￿ ￿,c￿e ￿,c7￿
,c, 72c72 72c￿, ￿,c72 ￿,c￿,
￿
The first entrance indicates market A, the second market B. N stands for simultaneous play
(early or late) in this market. 7￿ indicates that player i acts as a Stackelberg leader in the
respective market. When firms choose their timing strategy, they have to take into account




2 ￿￿.T h e
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the timing game describes the situation where each firm’s time
choice is the best answer to the competitor’s strategy - given the solution of the basic game.
























￿￿c￿ ’￿ c 2
Withouttheassumedlinkofthetwomarketsthroughajointcost-function,earlysimultaneous
play would result in both markets: Each firm prefers Stackelberg-leadership to simultaneous
play, but prefers the Nash-outcome to being a follower,
￿￿E7
￿c7
￿￿ : ￿￿E￿c￿￿ : ￿￿E7
￿c7
￿￿￿
Consequently, each player would choose ’’early’’ in the timing game and - after observing the
timingoftheotherplayer-choosetheCournot quantityof@*￿ineachmarket in thebasicgame.
Nevertheless,whentherearediseconomiesofscope,firmscoulddobetterspecializinginone
of the markets, such that different outcomes of the endogenous timing game can be expected.
Proposition 1 Whenever }￿} W ￿ f￿eS￿, early simultaneous play is the only equilibrium in
pure strategies.
Proof +Iru suhflvh fdofxodwlrqv vhh Dsshqgl{,:
Because of the symmetry of markets and firms, it suffices to consider the situation, where
one firm (say firm 1) is leading in any situation in which only one firm is leading. With respect
to markets, when there is sequential play in only one market, it is assumed to be market A.

























First, simultaneous play E￿ec￿e￿ with both firms choosing ’’early’’ in both markets and
selecting their Cournot quantity afterwards is an equilibrium: neither firm 1 nor firm 2 has an
incentive to deviate from this time choice. By moving late in one market a firm would have to
act like a follower in this market in the second stage and would obtain lower profits.
Second, there are no other equilibria in pure strategies: Firm 2 strictly prefers ￿2E￿ec￿e￿
to any outcomes resulting from being follower in one or two markets without being the leader
in at least one market. Thus, firm 1 leading in both markets (7￿c7￿￿ can not be an equilibrium:
firm 2 has an incentive to move early in both markets in the first stage. The same argument
applies to the situation, where firm 1 is leading in market A and there is early Nash in market
B E7￿c￿e￿ (firm 2 would deviate in market A). When there is E7￿c￿,￿, both firms have an
incentive to deviate in the timing stage: firm 1 prefers being leader in both markets and would
thus choose ’’early’’ in market B, whereas firm 2 could do better by choosing ’’early’’ in A and
B.
Also, both firms playing late in both markets cannot be an equilibrium. As leading in one
market is preferred to playing simultaneously in both markets, each firm has an incentive to
move early in one of the markets. This argument also holds for both firms playing early in one
market (say market A) but late in the other market (say market B): each has an incentive to
move early in the latter market. As E￿ec￿,￿ yields higher profits than E￿ec￿e￿, firms again
face a prisoner’s dilemma situation.
Finally, firm 1 moving early in market A and late in market B, while firm 2 chooses late in
A and early in B cannot be an equilibrium as both firms can achieve higher profits by moving
early also in their follower-market. This would yield ￿￿E7￿c￿e￿ (resp. ￿2E￿ec72￿￿,w h i c hi s
preferred to ￿￿E7￿c72￿.
If one considers only the outcomes where firms choose the same timing in both markets (i.e.
firm i choosing either (e,e) or (l,l)), one gets the condition on preferences necessary for early
simultaneousplaystatedbyHamilton/Slutzky: Theleader-positioninbothmarkets is preferred
tosimultaneousplay,whichispreferredtothefollower-positioninbothmarkets. Thepossibility
to ’’split strategies’’ (choosing ’’early’’ in one market and ’’late’’ in the other) thus seems to have
no significance for the resulting equilibrium in the above stated range of g.
As long as }￿ ￿ fceeHc the achieved equilibrium leads to higher profits than a situation
where each firm is the leader in one market and follower in the other. This is due to the fact
that the Stackelberg equilibrium involves higher outputs in each market and thus lower prices.
When g is small, the positive effect of specialization through producing asymmetrically cannot
outweigh the negative price-effect.
Joint profits would be maximized in a two-market monopoly situation. Nevertheless, this
outcome cannot be achieved, as the timing game provides only an instrument to commit to
the timing of an action, not to the action itself. A second mover is thus not able to commit to
produce zero output, after the first mover had chosen its quantity. Thus, if each firm moved
8early in one market and produced the monopoly quantity, both would enter the second market
in the late stage. Moving first thus implies offering the Stackelberg-leader quantity and lower
joint profits in both markets.
Proposition 2 When }W ￿ }￿} WW E’ 2 ￿
s
2￿ , there are two pure-strategy-equilibria of the
timing game, describing the situation where each firm is leading in one market (i. e. E7￿c72￿
and E72c7￿￿)￿ There is another potential equilibrium with both firms choosing ’ ’early’ ’ in both
markets, which is dominated by E7￿c72￿ and E72c7￿￿.
Corollary 3 When } ￿ fcD, each firm is able to monopolize the market, where it moves first.
Proof + vhh dovr Dsshqgl{,:
























Obviously, E7￿c72￿must be anequilibrium of thetiming game: Giventhetiming strategy of
the other firm, deviation can only lead to simultaneous play in the market, where the deviation
occurs. For both firms, this would yield lower profits.
But playing early Nash in both markets is also a potential equilibrium of the timing game.
Neitherofthefirmsisabletodobetterbychoosinganothertimingstrategy. Theonlypossibility
to deviate would be to choose late in one or two of the markets. But this would yield a profit
￿￿E7￿c￿e￿, ￿ 9’ ￿, that is lower than ￿￿E￿c￿￿. Nevertheless, this equilibrium is dominatedby
the other two equilibria for both players. Thus, if players were able to coordinate, the outcome
of the game would be E7￿c72￿ or E72c7￿￿.
It is easy to see that there is no other equilibrium of the timing game. In any of the other
situations, at least one of the players can improve its profit by choosing ’’early’’ in one of the
markets.
When each firm is leading in one market E7￿c72￿, the interior solution ceases to be valid as
soon as g is higher than 0.5.
15 The optimal quantity choice for the leading firm is then
%￿ ’ +2 ’
@
￿n}
This quantity is just high enough to give the second-mover no incentive to enter the market
where it is following: the marginal gain from entering- the price - equals the marginal loss the
competitor would incur (’ }%￿ ’ }+2). Consequently
%2 ’ +￿ ’f
48 Second-order-conditions are only satisfied with j?3=8. See also Appendix.








Each firm monopolizes one market and is able to avoid inefficiencies induced by diseconomies
of scope.
When }W ￿ }￿} WW, profits applying to being the leader in both markets are still greater
than profits applying to playing simultaneously in both markets, which again is preferred to
following in both markets. Nevertheless, simultaneous play is not the only equilibrium of the
timinggame: therearethetwoadditionalsequential-playequilibria,whichleadtohigherprofits
than simultaneous play in both markets. This is due to the increasing impact of g: producing
symmetrically in two markets causes production costs which can be avoided by specializing in
onemarket. Thisspecializationcanbeachievedwheneachfirmmovesfirstinonemarket. First
movers commit to aquantity high enough to prevent theother firm from entering. This quantity
mustbehigherthanthemonopoly-outputtopreventthefollowerfromentering. Itisevenhigher
than the output resulting from simultaneous play in two markets. But the negative price-effect
caused by higher production is offset by the efficiency gain caused by specialization.
Proposition 4 When }WW ￿ }￿￿, any time choice leading to sequential play in both markets
(E7￿c72￿ and E72c7￿￿, but also E7￿c7￿￿ and E72c72￿￿ can be an equilibrium of the timing
game.
Corollary 5 In the equilibria withone firmleadinginbothmarkets, the second mover obtains
higher profits than the leading firm.
Proof +vhh dovr Dsshqgl{,:
























First, E7￿c72￿ and E72c7￿￿ must be equilibria of the timing game. Even though each firm
prefers following in both markets, it is not able to induce this situation by choosing another
timing strategy in one or both markets. It can only reach simultaneous play in the market where
it deviates, which leads to lower profits than E7￿c72￿ and E72c7￿￿.
But also E7￿c7￿￿ and E72c72￿ are equilibria of the game: Deviation results in simultaneous
play in one or both markets and in lower profits for both firms.
Early simultaneous play in both markets cannot be an equilibrium any more. Each firm can
do better by moving latein both markets, thusobtaining ￿￿E7￿c7￿￿, ￿ 9’ ￿, which is preferred to
￿￿E￿c￿￿. Also, late simultaneousplayisnot anequilibrium: the best answer to(l, l) ismoving
early in both markets. The same arguments apply to E7￿c￿e￿ and E7￿c￿,￿￿
When onefirm is leading in two markets, the result of the quantity game is again a boundary
10solution.
16 The leading firm (say 1) prefers to leave onemarket (say B). Taking into account the
reaction of firm 2, itmaximizes its profits in the other market. The following firmconcentrates
its production on market B. Depending on g, it produces only little (}￿
I
D3￿




2 ￿ fcS￿H) in the second market. The leader sets quantities higher than the
monopoly quantity in its chosen ’’home-market’’ A to induce the follower to leave this market,
whereas the follower is able to react optimally and to supply a quantity less or equal to the
monopoly quantity in market B. Consequently, it obtains higher profits than the leader.
This result differs from the result when }￿} WW. There, ￿￿E7￿c7￿￿ : ￿￿E￿c￿￿ :
￿￿E7￿c7￿￿ (￿ 9’ ￿). When } ￿ }WW, leading in both markets is still preferred to playing
simultaneouslyinbothmarkets. But firmsdoevenbetterwhentheyareinthefollower-position
in the two markets: the high level of diseconomies of scope induces the leader to specialize in
one market, such that the follower is also able to establish a ’’home-market’’. Additionally,
its strategies are not distorted by strategic considerations, whereas the leader has to take into
account the reactions of the follower.
Again, if oneonlyconsidersstrategy-’’bundles’’,wherefirmschoosethesametimingin both
markets, theresults of Hamilton/Slutzky can be applied. Following in both markets is preferred
to leading in both markets, which is preferred to simultaneous play in both markets. The result
is thus either firm 1 or firm 2leading in bothmarkets. But thefact that firms can split strategies
leads to the other two sequential playequilibria, where eachfirm is leading in one market. This
is due to the fact that leading in one while following in the other market is preferred to leading/
following in one and playing simultaneously in the other market.
In all timing situations there is a critical value, for which a boundary solution appears. This
boundary solution implies, that one or both players leave one and concentrate on the other
market. Quantitiesineachfirms’’home-market’’arehigherthanthemonopolyoutputfor}￿￿,
but are falling in g, whereas in the other market they equal or approach zero with increasing
g. When } ￿ ￿, the optimal quantity in each firms home market is @*2, whereas in the other
market nothing is produced by that firm. This observation leads to
Proposition 6 When } ￿ ￿, the timing game ceases to have an impact on the outcome of the
basic game. Players are able to divide up markets and produce their optimal monopoly-output
regardless of their time choices.
Proof +vhh dovr Dsshqgl{,:
Consider first the situation E7￿c72￿. When the boundary solution is reached (} ’f ￿D￿,t h e
leader (Player 1 in A, Player 2 in B) sets a quantity high enough to prevent the follower from
entering the market in the late stage: %￿ ’ +2 ’
@





2 at} ’￿ . Wheng ishigherthanone,lessoutputisnecessaryto avoidcompetition
of the follower. But the leader will not supply less than @
2, as this is yet the individually optimal
output in monopoly.
49 Second-order conditions are satisfied for firm 1 as long as j?j ￿￿. See also Appendix.
11When there is one player leading in both markets, the mechanism is similar. In one market,
the leader produces zero, in the second market he sets a preemptive quantity, which equals
%￿ ’
@E23}￿





Again, this quantity is falling in g and reaches %6, when } ’￿ . The leader has no incentive
to reduce his supply any more, as %6 is his profit-maximizing quantity. The follower reacts
with %2 ’fand +2 ’ @
2 for any %￿ ￿
@E23}￿
2 .
When there is one player leading in one market and early Nash in the other market, the
boundary solution is reached when } ￿￿ fcS￿b (see Appendix). The leader then supplies a
preemptive quantity %￿ ’
@E￿3}￿
￿n}2 in the market with sequential play, and sets +￿ ’
@E}3￿￿2
￿n}2 in the
market with early simultaneous play. %￿ and +￿ are falling in g and reach @*2 and f respectively
at } ’￿ . As before, it is not rational to reduce output in the leader market even more, whereas
output cannot become negative in the Nash market. The follower reacts with %2 ’fand plays
+2 ’
@E}n￿￿
￿n}2 in the Nash market. +2 is increasing in g and equals the monopoly-output at } ’￿ .
But for }:￿ it is not rational for player 2 to supply more than +6: the optimal reaction of
player 1 in the Nash-market remains +￿ ’ffor any +2 ￿
@
2,g i v e n%￿ ’
@
2 in the other market,
+2 ’ @
2 for } ￿ ￿.
The same arguments apply to E7￿c￿e￿. The boundary-solution becomes valid for } ￿ ￿ I
2.
Optimal strategies are the same as in the situation withone player leading and earlyNash in the
other market. At } ’￿ , both players produce @*2 in one market and zero in the other market.
When there is early (late) simultaneous play in both markets, the boundary solution appears
in addition to the interior solution for } ￿ ￿:
18 %￿ ’
@
2, +￿ ’fand %￿ ’f , +￿ ’
@
2 is a stable
solution ofthebasicgameasit is each player’sstrategy isthebest responseto thestrategy ofthe
competitor. As the interior solution is dominated by the boundary solution, the outcome again
is the same as the outcome of an institutionalized monopoly in each market.
When one market clears before the other, the mechanism is the same: there exists the
boundary solution (%￿ ’
@
2, +￿ ’fand %￿ ’f , +￿ ’
@
2￿ in addition to the interior solution as
soon as } ￿ ￿.
19 But the boundary solution is preferred to the interior solution by both players
and would thus be the outcome of the basic game if pre-play communication was allowed.
Consequently, regardless of the timing situation, for } ￿ ￿ players are able to achieve their
maximal profit by specializing each in one market. The solution of the basic game is also the
same as the solution of the one-stage-game, such that the timing stage does not have an impact
on the outcome of the quantity setting game.





5 , the preemptive quantity is
d+5￿j,+4.j,
5+5￿j5, and the follower remains active in both
markets.
4; Theinteriorsolutionceasestobeanequilibriumforj ￿ 5: giventheNash-strategyofplayeri, {l @ |l @ d
6.j,
itpaystoreactwith aboundarystrategy {m @3and |m @ 5d
6.j. Thiscanalsobeseen bycomputingthesecond-
order-conditions.




effect is the welfare effect resulting from the impact of the timing game on total output. It
influences profits as well as consumer surplus. The cost or efficiency effect is the effect of
endogenous timing on production costs, induced by the impact on the level of specialization of
the firms. This effect influences mainly profits. But alsoconsumer surplus is influenced bythe
indirect effect of (lower) costs on output.
As a benchmark I consider the outcome of a one-stage game with two firms being
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As the timing game may lead to a monopolization of the markets, I will also consider welfare
ensuing from an institutionalized monopoly without (potential) competition, which equals
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The maximum welfare that could be achieved either with a social planner maximizing total
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￿ +￿ ’ @ in each market. Whereas with
13perfect price discrimination, profits equal summed welfare, in the case of a social planner it is
assumed that prices are zero and consumer welfare is maximized.
Proposition 7 Whenever the timing game leads to equilibria different from a one-stage game
without timing opportunity, the effects on welfare are positive.
Proof +vhh dovr Dsshqgl{,:
As long as }￿} W, the opportunity to time actions in the quantity-setting game does not
have an impact on the equilibrium of the basic game. The result of the timing stage is early
simultaneous play in both markets, such that quantities, prices and welfare are the same as in a
one-stage-game without timing-possibility.
Note, that in comparison to a two-market-monopoly, diversification of both firms yields
higher social surplus as long as }￿ ￿ f￿ee￿. Only when ￿ f￿ee￿ ￿ }￿} W, amonopoly would
be socially preferred to two-market competition with or without timing possibility. The dead-
weight-loss that can be attributed to a socially suboptimal output in monopoly is outweighed
by the efficiency-gain caused by specialization.
20
When }W ￿ }￿} WW andcoordinationbetweenplayersis allowed, thetwopossibleequilibria
arethesequential-play equilibriawith each firm leading inonemarket. In thiscase, equilibrium
strategies are
%￿ ’ +2 ’ i
@E}3￿￿
}2n2}32 sJo } ￿f￿D
@
￿n} sJo f￿D ￿ }￿} WW
and
%2 ’ +￿ ’ i
@E2}3￿￿
2E}2n2}32￿ sJo } ￿f￿D
f sJo f￿D ￿ }￿} WW
21￿
Comparing this equilibrium output with the output resulting from the one-stage-game,








￿ +￿) is higher with sequential play than with two-
market competition. Additionally, because of asymmetric production, diseconomies of scope
are avoided. Consequently, the welfare effect ({‘ ￿) must be positive.
22
With respect to the division of the welfare increase on CS and PS, one finds that both -








￿￿ ￿ ￿7E￿c￿￿ : f
53 Nevertheless, monopoly does not Pareto-dominate the two-market-competition: whereas producers gain,
consumers incur a reduction of consumer-surplus, as supply is smaller.
54 See Appendix .
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5+4.5j,
+4.j,5 iru 3>8 ￿ j?j ￿￿=
14The positiveimpact on consumer surplus increases ing for }W ￿ }￿f￿D (supply decreases less
with sequential, than with simultaneous play) but it decreases in g for f￿D ￿ }￿} WW (boundary
solution where supply approaches @*2 with g approaching 1). In comparison, the impact on
profits increases in g in the whole range between }W ￿ }￿} WW, due to the efficiency gain
resulting from specialization.
Social welfare is also higher than in a two-market monopoly:





E@￿ %￿_% ￿ ‘E￿c￿￿’
@2E} ￿￿￿2E￿}2 ￿ 2} n￿ ￿
eE}2 n2 } ￿ 2￿2 ￿
It outweighs the negative cost-effect
￿￿E7
￿c7
2￿’2}% ￿ +￿ ’
}@2E} ￿ ￿￿E2} ￿ ￿￿
E}2 n2 } ￿ 2￿2 ￿
When } ￿ f￿D, markets are monopolized. Nevertheless, supply is higher than in a two-market-
monopoly: the leader has to set a quantity just high enough to make it unprofitable for the






















The (positive) difference in consumer surplus is decreasing in g as output is decreasing
continuouslywhenfirmsplayE7￿c7￿￿,whereasitisindependentfromginmonopoly. Likewise,
the (negative) profit- difference is decreasing in g, as specialization with sequential play leads
to a an elimination of costs whereas supply approaches the monopoly-supply with increasing
diseconomies of scope.
When }WW ￿ }￿￿c there are four equilibria of the timing game: the two equilibria with
each firm leading in one market (E7￿c72￿ and E72c7￿￿ resp.) and the two equilibria where one
p l a y e ri sl e a d i n gi nb o t hm a r k e t s( E7￿c7￿￿ and E72c72￿ resp.). All of them yield higher social
surplus than two-market competition in a one stage game. Both - consumers and firms- gain,




￿￿ ￿ ￿7E￿c￿￿ : f
56 Again, this result can also be derived by comparing directly the welfare resulting from the two situations:
Z+Vl>Vm,@
d5+;j6.49j5￿69j.48,
7+j5.5j￿5,5 iru j ?3=8
d
5+4.5j,














￿￿ ￿ ￿7E￿c￿￿ : f
It can be seen that the equilibria with each player leading in one market E7￿c7￿￿ imply higher
total output and welfare than equilibria with one player leading in both markets E7￿c7￿￿. This
is due to the fact, that - when one firm is leading in both markets - the follower is able to react
optimally in the market that the leader leaves and acts there as a monopolist without potential
rivalry. At the same time, output in the market where the leader remains active is only slightly
higher than if there was E7￿c7￿￿. Consequently, total profits are greater and consumer surplus
is lower with E7￿c7￿￿ than with E7￿c7￿￿. This again implies lower total welfare, as supply is
further away from the first-best solution.
Comparing the resulting equilibria of the timing game with the outcome of an
institutionalized monopoly, the same qualitative result can be drawn as with }W ￿ }￿} WW:
Whereas consumer welfare is higher with endogenous timing, profits are lower. The higher g,

























With ￿ ￿ }￿2, any equilibrium of the timing game yields the same outcome as an
institutionalized two-market monopoly. Provided that players are able to coordinate, this result
can also be achieved in a one-stage game without timing possibility, such that the timing game
ceases to have an impact on costs, prices and quantities supplied.
5. Concluding Remarks
In the above two-market model with diseconomies of scope in production, it could be shown
that the extension of a basic Cournot game with a timing game may lead to outcomes of the
basic game, which differ from the outcomes of a one-stage Cournot-game with simultaneous
quantity choice. The timing game allows firms to move sequentially and thus to commit to
specialize in the basic game. It supports sequential play equilibria, where firms concentrate on
one market. Thus, inefficiencies through socially undesirable diversification are avoided.
Two-market competition with timing possibility yields higher welfare than a monopoly in
each market when diseconomies of scope are not too high. With very low diseconomies, firms
compete in both markets, but the negative cost-effect is surpassed by a positive quantity effect.
When diseconomies of scope are in a middle range, firms monopolize each one market, but
offer higher quantities than in monopoly to deter the competitor from entering. This result is
16due to the timing-possibility, which allows firms to commit to quantities before the other firm
moves. Only when diseconomies of scope are very high, the threat to enter the competitors
home market is not credible any more and the outcome resembles the monopoly outcome.
In the long run, multiproduct firms might be able to divide themselves up into distinct units
with separated production and marketing facilities, thus eliminating the negative impact of the
two-market activity.
24 Firmswould then play simultaneously in both markets and gain Cournot-
Nash profits. This would favor consumers and would lead to higher welfare, as output is higher
and inefficiencies are avoided. It can be shown, that, if firms could first choose production
facilities (joint or separated) before they choose timing and quantities, both players would
choose the technology without diseconomies of scope - even if they end up with lower profits.
25
Consequently, the above derived results only apply temporarily or when fix-costs of building
up a distinct unit are too high.
Whereas diseconomies of scope are a realistic assumption for the production sphere when
learning effects can not be fully exploited, multiproduct firms often gain because fixed assets
can be shared (e.g. sharing marketing facilities), such that average costs decline. A complete
evaluation of conglomerate firms would also have to take into account these potential gains.
V ery often, the results obtained with sequential play can also be obtained if firms were able
to delegate marketing decisions to managers. It would therefore be interesting to analyze the
impactofdelegationdecisionsinthecontextdescribedabove,whenownersareabletounder-or
overallocate costs to managers of each division. We will leave this question for future research.
57 Alternatively, onecould think of anew technologyallowing fortwo-product productionwithout anyadditional
costs or of potential one-market competitors not facing negative cost- spillovers.
58 This is the case when diseconomies of scope are in a middle range.
17Figure 3.2.a: Profits Player 1
Figure 3.2.b: Profits Player 2
18Figure 3.3.a: Equilibrium Profits Player 1
Figure 3.3.b: Equilibrium profits Player 2
19Figure 3.3.c: Both Players’ Equilibrium Profits
20Appendix A: Solution of the two stage game
The extended game is to be solved by backwards induction. First the solution of the quantity-
setting game for each timing situation and for different levels of diseconomies of scope is to be
calculated. In the first stage firms compare profits pertaining to each timing situation and find
their best time choice.
A.1 Solution of the second stage
In the second stage, firms maximize
￿￿ ’ %￿E@ ￿%￿ ￿ %2￿n+￿E@￿ +￿ ￿ +2￿ ￿ }%￿+￿
￿2 ’ %2E@ ￿%￿ ￿ %2￿n+2E@￿ +￿ ￿ +2￿ ￿ }%2+2
over x and y, subject to
%c + ￿ f￿
It is also reasonable to assume, that firms would not supply more than demand would allow:
%￿ n %2 ￿ @
+￿ n +2 ￿ @
In simultaneous play, each players’ quantities must be the optimal response to the chosen
quantities of theother. When firms move sequentially, the leader takesinto account the reaction
of the follower to his strategies in market(s) he is leading.
A.1.1 Profits applying to (￿ec￿e￿’(￿,c￿,￿G
} ￿ ￿ G
In this case profits are maximized for











￿ ￿ } ￿ 2:
In addition to the (interior) solution there is another equilibrium implying
%￿ ’ +￿ ’
@
2
@?_ %￿ ’ +￿ ’f c￿ 9’ ￿￿
To see this, given %￿ ’ @
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As the interior solution yields negative output in market A, the following conditions (Kuhn-
Tucker-conditions) are checked for the boundary solutions (%2 ’fand +2 : f, %2 : f and
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Furthermore, the above restrictions for the two variables are to be taken into account. It is easy
to see that the only solution fulfilling these conditions is %2 ’fand +2 ’
@
2￿













2 ￿ f sJo } ￿ 2￿
The interior solution ceases to be valid: Players have an incentive to deviate even when the
other isplaying theNash-strategy proposed by the interior solution. Theonly equilibrium isthe
boundary solution.
A.1.2 Profits applying to (￿ec￿,￿’E ￿,c￿e￿:
In this case, one market clears before the other. Firms have to take into account their optimal
+￿, over which they decide late, when choosing %￿ early.
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Checking the second-order-conditions, one sees, that the interior solution ceases to be a













Firms then move to a boundary solution with
%￿ ’ +￿ ’
@
2
@?_ %￿ ’ +￿ ’f c￿ 9’ ￿￿
But as in the case with early (late) simultaneous play in both markets, this boundary solution
existsand replaces theinteriorsolutionas soonas} ￿ ￿, asit ispreferred to theinterior solution
for both players.
To see this, first assume, that %2 ’fand check the optimal response of player 1. Player 1
has to takeinto account the reaction of player 2 in market B. He also knows his optimal strategy
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Obviously, %￿ ’ @
2 is the optimal response to %2 ’f . Neither %￿ : @
2,n o r%￿ ￿ @
2 can increase
1’s profits. Supplying more reduces revenue in market A without changing revenue in market
B, whereas supplying less changes 1’s strategy also in market B and thus influences production
costs (as +￿ is not zero any more). Marginally,
Y￿￿
Y%￿ E %￿ ’
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%2 ’fis also the optimal response to %￿ ’
@
2.G i v e n%￿ ’
@
2, the reactions in market B are
+￿ ’ i
@E￿3}￿n%2
￿ ￿s %2 :
@E}3￿￿
}





































59 Note, that one has to take into account the different reactions in the late stage, depending on the direction of
the derivative. Thus,
|4 @ d￿5{4
6 , if one considers a neagtive deviation (less supply), whereas |4 @3 > if one considers a positive
deviation (more supply).
23Hence, both player’s strategies are optimal responses to each other and %￿ ’ +￿ ’
@
2 and
%￿ ’ +￿ ’f , ￿ 9’ ￿, is an equilibrium for } ￿ ￿.
A.1.3 Profits applying to 7￿c￿eE’ ￿ec72 ’ 7￿c￿e ’ ￿ec7￿￿:
In this situation, only %2 is chosen late, whereas firms decide early over %￿c+ ￿ and +2.





2 ￿s %￿ ￿@￿ }+2
f ￿s %￿ ￿ @ ￿ }+2
￿
Firm 1 is thus able to induce firm 2 to leave the market without having to satisfy the whole
demand.
In the early stage, players maximize over %￿c+ ￿ and +2, taking into account player 2’s
reaction in A. This leads to an interior solution whenever }￿ ￿ I
2 E￿ f￿.f.￿. At this point,
the optimal %￿ proposed by the interior solution equals @ ￿ }+2, to which 2 reacts %2 ’f(the
marginal gain from entering equals the marginal negative impact on production costs). For any
%￿ smaller than this, firm 2 would enter the market again. The supply needed to keep player 2
out of the market is falling in g. Thus, for } ￿ ￿ I
2, player 1 offers the maximum of @ ￿ }+2
and %6 ’ @*2 and is thus able to monopolize his market. Firm 2 reacts by concentrating on the
market with simultaneous play.
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5: |4 would become negative when jA4. At the same time, for any j ￿ 4, {4 @ d@5 (which is bigger than
d ￿ j|5) is the optimal strategy for player 1. It is thus possible to rewrite the conditions for |4 depending on
{4=
5; Thecriticalvalueofj @ 4 s
5 ￿ 3>:3:isachievedbyinsertingthevaluesoftheinteriorsolutionin{4 @ d￿j|5
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To see that the boundary solution (%￿c+ ￿ ’fif
￿ I
2 ￿ }￿￿) is an equilibrium of the basic












































Consequently, player 1 would not want to decrease %￿and is happy with +￿.









































InmarketA themarginal impact of%￿ onprofitsisalwaysnegativefor}￿￿, becauseplayer
1 already produces more than his optimal monopoly-quantity and %2 ’ffor any %￿ :
@E￿3}￿
￿n}2 .
In market B the marginal impact on revenue is zero: Being at the optimum in market B, the
marginal decrease of +2 resulting from a marginal increase of %￿ does not influence revenue
there. The marginal impact on production-costs is negative, such that the total effect must also
be negative. The proposed solution for +￿ is the optimal solution for player 1, as
Y￿￿
Y+￿ ’f .
Player 2 does not want to deviate, if +2 ’
@E}n￿￿
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25the proposed boundary solution is an equilibrium of the basic game.
It is obvious, that %￿ ’ @
2, %2 ’f , +￿ ’f , +2 ’ @
2, is the outcome of the game as soon as
} ￿ ￿.A t} ’￿ ,
@E￿3}￿
￿n}2 ’ @
2 .F o r}:￿, the output needed to keep player 2 out of the market
is even lower than
@
2. But player 1 is not interested to reduce supply in his leading market any
more, because this does not have an impact on player 2’s reaction in this market (%2 ’f )a n d
his own his optimal strategy in market B ( +￿ ’f ), but reduces total profits in his monopolized
market. The same reasoning applies to player 2 in market B.
A.1.4 Profits applying to ￿,c7￿E’ ￿,c72 ’ 7￿c￿, ’ 7￿c￿,￿:
In this case, firms decide late over %2c+ ￿and +2. Firm 1 chooses only %￿ at the early stage and
takes into account the optimal reaction of firm 2 in the late stage.
Again, there is a critical value } ￿ f￿S￿b, at which the interior solution leads to %2 ’f
(the follower’s output equals zero) whereas %￿ ’ @ ￿ }+2￿ As %2 cannot become negative,
%￿ ’ 4@ i@ ￿ }+2c @
2j is the optimal strategy for player 1 in his leading market for any
￿ f￿S￿b ￿ }￿￿. Output and prices in both markets are then the same as with 7￿c￿e.
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6.j5 and the fact, thatplayer 2’s profit-maximizing quantity
is d
5 when |4 @3and {5 @3(no competition in market B and no diseconomies of scope).
63 Again, the critical value for g in the condition for {4 is obtained by not allowing {5 to be negative. At this
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The interior solution follows from standard profit maximization. To prove, that the boundary
solutionisanequilibrium,Iproceedasbeforeandshow,thatneitherofthefirmshasanincentive
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Thus, player 1’s strategy is the optimal answer to the strategy of player 2.




￿n}2 c% 2 ’f c+ ￿ ’
@E}3￿￿2










￿n}2 c% 2 ’f c+ ￿ ’
@E}3￿￿2







Therefore, the boundary solution is an equilibrium of the game for ￿ f￿S￿b ￿ }￿￿.
When } ￿ ￿, less (equal) supply than the optimal monopoly supply is necessary to induce
the competitor to stay out of the market. Consequently, players switch to %￿ ’
@
2, %2 ’f ,
+￿ ’f , +2 ’ @
2￿
A.1.5 Profits applying to 7￿c72 E’ 72c7￿￿G
In this situation each firm acts like a leader in one market. At } ’
￿
2, second-order conditions
do not hold any more. Firm 1 then supplies %￿ ’ @ ￿ }+ 2 whereas firm 2 supplies +2 ’ @ ￿ }
%2cwhich prevents mutual entry in thelatestage. When} ￿ ￿, the monopoly-output %6 is high
enough to deprive the otherfirm of the incentiveto enter theleader-market: given both produce
%6, the marginal gain of entering the others market in the late stage is R ’
@
2 and equals or is
lower than the potential loss of } @
2.
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￿ ’￿ c2
The interior solution follows from standard profit-maximization. To check, if the boundary
solution is an equilibrium, I calculate the partial derivatives of the profit-functions at the
proposed values for %￿ and +2:
Y￿￿
Y%￿ E%￿ ’ @






























Y%￿o ￿ f for }￿
￿
2￿
By symmetry, the same result holds for player 2, such that the boundary solution is an
equilibrium for ￿
2 ￿ }￿￿. When } ￿ ￿, the monopoly output is bigger than the output
proposed by the boundary solution and the only equilibrium is
%￿ ’
@
2, %2 ’f , +￿ ’f , +2 ’
@
2￿
A.1.6 Profits applying to 7￿c7￿ E’ 72c72￿G
Inthiscase,onefirm(firm1)isabletomovebeforetheotherfirminbothmarkets. Itisthusable
to choose its’ preferred points on firm 2’s reaction curves. Again, there are different equilibria,
dependingonthevalueofg. Thereisaninteriorsolution,wherefirm1 isactiveinbothmarkets.
This solution ceases to be an equilibrium when } ￿ 2￿
s
2 ￿ f￿DHS (second-order-conditions
do not hold any more). The leading firm 1 then switches to the boundary and leaves one market
(say market B). Firm 2 remains active in both markets for }￿
I
D3￿
2 ￿ f￿S￿H.B u tw h e ngi s
equal or bigger than this value, it leaves the market where firm 1 is active and concentrates on
market B.
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Assuming, that player 1 concentrates on market B for } ￿ 2 ￿
s
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The equilibrium for }￿2 ￿
s






2 , the above proposed solution (firm 1 leaving one market and firm 2 remaining active


































Firm 2’s strategy is derived from its reaction-function and must therefore be the optimal













64 To derive this result, one has to insert the optimal reaction for firm 2, irrespective of |4 @3 > that is
{5+{4>| 4,@
d+5￿j,￿5{4.j|4

























































of ￿2 at %2 ’fand +2 ’ @
2 must equal zero.
Finally, when }:￿, the same argument applies as in the former cases: The %￿ necessary
to prevent firm 2 from entering the market is smaller than %6, such that the optimal solution is
%￿ ’ %6 ’ @
2, %2 ’f , +￿ ’fand +2 ’ +6 ’ @
2.
A.2 Solution of the first stage
In the timing stage of the extended game, players choose the optimal timing, comparing
the profits pertaining to each timing situation and taking into account the strategy space of




2 ), t = e, l, constitute an
equilibrium, when for both firms its own timing is the best answer to the competitors timing
choice.
Optimal profits for the different timing situations depending on g are plotted in fig. 3.3 c)
(profits are calculated for @ ’￿ . Whereas the level of profits changes with different a, the
critical values for g remain the same).
As long as }￿} W, ￿￿E7￿c￿e￿ is higher than ￿￿E7￿c72￿. It is also higher than ￿￿E￿c￿￿





must be the only equilibrium. In any other situation one of the firms having chosen ’’late’’ is
able to do better by choosing early.
When g gets bigger than g*, ￿￿E7￿c￿e￿’￿ 2E￿ec72￿ ￿ ￿￿E7￿c72￿￿ The situation
dominates any timing-situation achievable for each firm given the other firm chooses (e, l)








2 ) resp.) must be
equilibria of the timing-game.
Profitsapplyingto(7￿c7￿￿arepreferredtoprofitsresultingfromE￿c￿￿bybothfirmswhen




2 ) leading to early simultaneous play in
both markets is a (dominated) equilibrium of the timing game as long as }￿} WW. At this point,
when there was E￿ec72￿, firm 2 would choose the boundary solution as a leader in market B.
￿￿E￿ec72￿ then becomes higher than ￿￿E￿c￿￿csuch that (e￿
￿ ,e ￿
￿ ￿ is not any more the optimal
65 As before, there is to be made a difference in the direction of deviation. The optimal reaction of firm 2 in
market A, when firm1 producesmarginallymore,remains{5 @3 , whereasitis{5 @
d+5￿j,￿5{4.j|4
7￿j5 ,iffi r m
1 produces marginally less.
30response to (e￿
2 ,e￿








2 ) remain equilibria of the
timinggame,asforbothfirmstheyarepreferredtoanyotherachievablesituation. Buttwoother
equilibria appear, being described by one firm leading in two markets. Both firms prefer the
followership-role in both markets. Nevertheless, as the leader can only achieve simultaneous








2 ) are equilibria of the timing
game.
31Appendix B: Welfare Effects
B.1 Welfare applying to equilibrium timing situations
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When }￿} W, there is no difference between the extended game and the basic game. The
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￿ f ￿s } ￿￿ f￿ee￿ ￿
Consumers are better off with two-market competition whereas firms incur losses in
comparison to a monopolistic setting.
(2) }W ￿ }￿} WW
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In thisrangeof g therearetwo potential equilibria: onewith each firm leading in one market
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